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Toward a Sociology of Generational Change: Generational Exper ience and Generational Per for mance in Ger man Foreign Policy
B e n j a m i n H e r b o r t h
At times, processes of social change catch their social-scientifi c observers by surprise. In fact, one might say that only instances of change that have not been and could not have been predicted constitute "genuine" change. Predictable change, on the contrary, would simply be a variation alongside a predetermined trajectory, thus not involving anything new. The social sciences are no strangers to historical and analytical surprises of the former kind, and not just since the end of the Cold War, the fi eld of International Relations (IR), too, is a case in point. Hence the ubiquity of what Friedrich Kratochwil has called the "embarrassment of changes." generational analysis is often considered intuitively plausible as an analytical lense. Notably, in one of IR's truly classical texts, Kenneth Waltz's Man, the State, and War, a far more classical text is cited in order to lend plausibility to the notion of generational change: "Moses led Israel forty years in the wilderness so that the slave generation might die and a new generation learn to live in freedom." 2 While such references remain anecdotal, more systematically the question of whether or not a particular course of action, a line of argument, or a political strategy appears plausible crucially depends on references to what Patrick Jackson has called "rhetorical commonplaces."
3 It stands to reason that at least one powerful mechanism by which such fi gurations of common sense are historically forged consists in generationally specifi c formative experiences. 4 To be sure, people are born continually, and boxing them together is a deliberate analytical exercise at best, or a sweeping reifi cation at worst.
5 To the extent, however, that formative generational experiences of broader historical relevance stand out as catastrophic, nonquotidien events, they serve effectively as points of orientation. The reifi ed organization of historical experience into relatively stable generational cohorts might thus not be committed by scholarly observers, it also takes place in practice. Once the narrative of a particular generational cohort has been established in political discourse, it tends to take on a life of its own-the farther we move away from 1968 the more 68ers seem to surface, and along the way alternative sources of biographical experience lose importance.
Along these lines, in a constructivist move avant la lettre, Michael Roskin has proposed to study foreign policy change in terms of shifting generational paradigms. Roskin builds on Thomas Kuhn's notion of paradigm shifts in order to account for fundamental re-orientations of U.S. foreign policy along interventionist or noninterventionist lines, that is, the fact that "United States policy makers deem much of the globe to be worth fi ghting for, while at other times they regard most of the world with indifference."
6 He thus extends the notion of paradigm shifts beyond its original context, the structure of scientifi c revolutions, and takes it to provide a 'theory of the innovation and diffusion of knowledge applicable to all fi elds, including foreign policy.' 7 Being political rather than scientifi c in nature, however, foreign policy paradigms need to stand a test of political practice rather than abstract verifi cation. This is where the concept of generations comes in. Characteristically, Roskin proposes, "An elite generation freezes upon either an interventionist or noninter-ventionist paradigm usually after some foreign-policy catastrophe wrought by the application of the opposite paradigm."
